Restricted views of process behaviour result in a form of abstraction which is useful in the construction of speci cations involving faulttolerance and atomicity. This paper presents an operational characterisation of abstraction for refusable and non-refusable events, in terms of testing. This view is related to standard notions of testing, and to the denotational characterisations, and it is encapsulated within the CSP denotational semantics. It informs, reinforces and extends the traditional denotational approach to abstraction.
Introduction
Abstraction arises in a system when some of its activity is not directly observable. In such cases, the nature of the internal activity may only be indirectly inferred from the visible behaviour of the process. A form of abstraction thus arises when an observer only has a restricted view of the system. This situation may arise for example in the context of fault-tolerant systems if an observer interacts with the system on particular activities, but is unconcerned with the fault-tolerance mechanisms, which may be considered as abstracted. It also arises in the context of security, where a`low-level' user should be prevented from achieving any interaction with the more secret parts of the system.
Process algebraic approaches to abstraction generally provide some operators to provide abstraction. In the context of CSP, which is the concern of this paper, the hiding operator (often called the`abstraction' operator) provides a mechanism for removing particular events from the process' interface and making them internal. Events internalised in this way become urgent (nonrefusable). However, Roscoe Ros97] has observed that events in a process' interface generally fall the two categories of refusable and non-refusable, and that both kinds of event can be abstracted. This has led to a more sophisticated understanding of abstraction, expressed within the CSP language and in terms of its denotational semantics.
The aim of this paper is to provide an alternative understanding of abstraction, by taking an operational view in terms of testing. This will provide a more direct de nition of abstraction, independently of any particular process algebra, and will thereby provide a more explicit and intuitive characterisation. This may inform and throw new light on the denotational approach.
Notation
CSP is an abstract language designed to describe the communication patterns of processes in terms of events that they may engage in. For a fuller introduction to the language and the semantic models, the reader is referred to Ros97] .
In CSP, systems are modelled in terms of the events that they can perform. The set of all possible events ( xed at the beginning of the analysis) is denoted . Events may be atomic in structure or may consist of a number of distinct components or elds. Examples of events used in this paper are l n and h r , which are atomic events, and in:3 which is a compound event modelling the occurrence of the message 3 along channel in.
Processes are the entities that are described by CSP expressions, and they are described in terms of the possible events that they may engage in. The process RUN A is repeatedly willing to engage in any event from the set A. The process CHAOS A is able to repeatedly engage in events from A, but might at any time nondeterministically refuse to perform any. The process STOP is unable to perform any events.
The pre xed process a ! P is able initially to perform only a, and subse-quently to behave as P. The pre x choice process x : A ! P(x) o ers a choice of all the events in the set A , and its subsequent behaviour P(x) is determined by the event chosen. The output c!v ! P is able initially to perform only c:v, the output of v on channel c, after which it behaves as P. The input c?x : T ! P(x) can accept any input x of type T along channel c, following which it behaves as P(x). If the type T of the channel is clear from the context then it may be elided from the input, which becomes c?x ! P(x).
Its rst event will be any event of the form c:t where t 2 T. The process P 2 Q (pronounced`P external choice Q') is initially willing to behave either as P or as Q, with the choice resolved (by the process' environment) on performance of the rst event. The process P u Q (pronounced`P internal choice Q') can behave either as P or as Q, and the environment of the process has no control over which. The process P n A behaves as P, but with all of the events in A performed internally where they were previously external events. Processes may also be composed in parallel. If D is a set of events then the process P j D ]j Q behaves as P and Q acting concurrently, with the requirement that they have to synchronise on any event in the synchronisation set D; events not in D may be performed by either process independently of the other. Interleaving is a special form of parallel operator in which the two components do not interact on any events: it is written P jjj Q, and is equivalent to P j fg]jQ.
There is also an indexed form jjj i2I P i . Processes may also be recursively de ned by means of equational de nitions. The operational semantics of CSP processes de nes, for any particular process, which events the process can perform next, and the possible processes that can be subsequently . For example, the process a ! P can perform an a event and reach the process P. This is written (a ! P) a ?! P. The process (a ! P) n fag can perform an internal event, denoted , and reach the process P n fag. This is written (a ! P) n fag ?! (P n fag). For the full operational semantics of CSP, see Sch98] .
The traces of a process P, traces(P), is de ned to be the set of nite sequences of events from that P may possibly perform. Examples of traces include the empty trace hi, and hin:3; out:3; in:5i which is a possible trace of the recursive process COPY = in?x : T ! out!x ! COPY . The set of in nite traces, in nites(P), are the in nite sequences of events from that P might possibly perform.
The failures of a process P, failures(P), is de ned to be the set of trace/refusal pairs (tr; X ) that P can exhibit, where tr is a trace and X is a set of events that P can refuse to participate in after some execution of the sequence of events tr. Examples of failures include the empty failure (hi; ?), and the trace/refusal pair (hin:3; out:3; in:5i; fout:3; out:4g) which is a possible failure of COPY . The divergences of a process P, divergences(P), are those sequences of events during whose occurrence P might perform an in nite sequence of internal events. The FDI semantics of a process P consists of the three sets of failures, divergences, and in nite traces of P: FDI (P) = hfailures(P); divergences(P); in nites(P)i.
All the denotational models for CSP are covered in detail in Ros97].
The`after' operator which gives the behaviour of a process P after a trace tr is written as P = tr. It is a partial operator (since tr might not be a trace of P), giving those failures, divergences, and in nite traces of P which are subsequent to the performance of the events in tr.
A process P is deterministic if it is unable to refuse events that it can do: (tr; X ) 2 failures(P)^(tr a hai; ?) 2 failures(P) ) (tr; X fag) 6 2 failures(P) If P is deterministic, then it must be deterministic at all times: P = tr is also deterministic, for any trace tr of P.
3 Testing
Abstraction will be characterised in terms of the interfaces through which processes (and tests) can interact, and in terms of distinguishing refusable from non-refusable events. We are interested in testing processes P by means of test processes T, which can interact with P only through an interface L (where L stands for low-level events). The set H will denote all the events that are not in the set L. These are the events that P might engage in but which the test T has no access to.
Thus the set of all events = L H , where L \ H = ?.
The set L is itself divided up into`refusable' events LR and`non-refusable' events LN , where`refusable' is from the point of view of the environment of the process P under test (i.e., whether the environment is in a position to refuse them). For example, output events of P are generally non-refusable, whereas input events are generally refusable, e.g. the environment can refuse to press a key on the keyboard, but it cannot refuse to allow an event to appear on the screen. An related view is to consider the set LN as those events whose occurrence is entirely under the control of the process P, whereas LR consists of those events which require cooperation from the environment.
H is also divided up into the disjoint sets HR and HN . Four subsets of are thus identi ed: HN , HR, LN and LR. These sets are pairwise disjoint, and their union is .
This partition of will be characterised by a function p which indicates for each event which set it is in: p : ! fhn; hr; ln; lrg The relationship between p and the sets of the partition is that HN p = fa j p(a) = hng HR p = fa j p(a) = hrg LN p = fa j p(a) = lng LR p = fa j p(a) = lrg
The sets H , L, HN , HR, LN and LR are dependent on the partition function p and so will generally be subscripted with the p. In this paper, we follow the The testing relations will be de ned with respect to a partition function p. We now de ne the notion of a LN p test: Di erent notions of testing are captured by di erent modalities of successful testing: may testing is concerned with the possibility of successful execution, and must testing is concerned with the guarantee of successful execution.
It is a well-known result Hen88] that standard may and must testing correspond directly to the denotational semantics: two processes are may testing equivalent precisely when they have the same trace semantics; and two processes are must testing equivalent if and only if they have the same FDI semantics.
May testing
The notion of may p testing can now be de ned. For generality and consistency of approach with must p testing introduced later, it is parametrised by the partition function p. However, observe that it is independent of the way H p and L p are themselves partitioned into refusable and non-refusable events. Thus the refusability or otherwise of high-level events is irrelevant to may testing. Definition 3.3 If P is a process, and T is a LN p test, then P may p T if and only if there is some successful execution e of (P j L p ]j T) n L p 2 Observe that there will be some successful execution of (P j L p ]j T) n L p if and only if there is some successful execution of P j L p ]j T. The events in L p are hidden to make the de nition similar to the de nition for must p testing which will come later.
A test T has access only to the events L p that P can perform, and not the high-level events H p . In other words, T can interact with P only on the events in L p , so the behaviour of T in the test will be independent of the events in H p that P performs. Furthermore, the non-refusable events LN p that P might perform cannot be blocked by T (at least, not before an ! success event), though the subsequent behaviour of T might depend on which such events were performed. The test thus allows its result to depend on the observation of events from LN p even though T has no control over their occurrence. This means that if only events in L can be observed, then P and Q should be considered equivalent if any test which has access only to the events in L (a particular view of the process), and does not block the events in LN p , cannot tell the di erence between P and Q.
The following relationship between this form of may p testing and the standard de Nicola/Hennessy form of may testing dNH87] makes it clear that this is a generalisation, in that may testing is simply may p0 testing for a particular partition p 0 .
If p 0 is the partition that considers all events as low-level refusable events, then all events will be visible to the testing process, which has no constraints on being required to accept any of them. In this case LR p0 = , and H p0 and LN p0 are all ?. It then turns out that may p0 testing is equivalent to the standard notion of may testing. In this case, the testing process has access to all the events that the processes under test can perform; and is able to block any of them, which is exactly the situation in may testing. This is the most powerful kind of test within this framework: the one which allows the most distinctions to be made.
In This is illustrated in Figure 3 2 This means that if two processes are equivalent under may testing for a particular set L, then the precise nature of LN p and LR p are not relevant|they will remain equivalent whatever the sets LN p and LR p happen to be, subject to their union remaining L.
Hence may testing need only be parametrised by the set L; since the ner distinctions made by LN p and LR p make no di erence at the level of may testing.
A straightforward consequence of the de nitions is as follows: This lemma states that if some low-level events are promoted to become highlevel events, then any processes that were previously equivalent will remain so: testing processes have access to even less information. If two processes cannot be distinguished by any tests which have access to L p , then they will never be distinguished by any tests which have access to a smaller set of events L p 0 L p ; in fact this smaller set of tests is subsumed within the previous set of tests. 
Re nement
The operational characterisation of may testing equivalence generalises in the usual way to may p testing re nement. Essentially, Q will be a re nement of P if any test T that Q may succeed can also allow P to succeed:
The traditional view of re nement considers Q as`an implementation of P, where P encapsulates or describes the permissible behaviour. From the point of view of may testing, this means that if Q is able to interact with its environment in some way, then this should also be allowed by the speci cation P: in other words, P should also be able to interact with the same environment to achieve the same result. The process Q should never be able to achieve anything not permitted by P. For example, l1 ! STOP 2 l2 ! STOP v may p l1 ! STOP Any test which the right hand process may pass may also be passed by the left hand process.
Must testing
Must testing can be considered as the dual of may testing. In may testing, a process may pass a test if there is some successful execution. In must testing, a process must pass a test if every execution is successful. Since partial executions might not reach a success state because the execution has not run for long enough, attention is focused onto complete executions 2 . An execution e of a process P will be considered to be complete if P could be unable to extend it. This will certainly be the case if e is in nite, but it will also arise if e nishes in a stable state where only refusable events are possible| since the process might be prevented from continuing its execution. However, if there are any non-refusable events available, then the execution is not complete since it is entirely within the process' control to continue the execution.
Definition 3.9 An execution e is complete with respect to (a set of nonrefusable events) N if
1. e is in nite; or 2. e is nite, and the last state Q of e can perform neither internal transitions nor transitions from N .
2
The point is to consider the execution as complete even if refusable events are possible. Such executions could be complete executions if the process is placed in a high-level environment (which the test cannot know about) in which such events are blocked. Must testing can now be de ned: Definition 3.10 If P is a process, and T is an LN p test, then P must p T if and only if every complete execution (with respect to LN p HN p ) of (P j L p ]j T) n L p is successful.
Example 3.11 Let P 1 be the process:
2 l r ! l n ! P 1 De ne the test T 1 = l n ! RUN ln 2 l r ! l n ! ! ! STOP. This will succeed as long as the process under test (1) cannot perform l n before l r , and (2) is guaranteed to be able to accept l r and then provide l n .
Then P 1 must T. If its choice is in favour of l r , then the complete execution is successful. If its choice is in favour of the high-level event, then the complete execution must include the second high-level event since this is not refusable, and so progress to the low-level events and hence to the success state.
On the other hand, for the test T 2 = l n ! ! ! STOP, we have that :(P 1 must T 2 ). The test does not provide l r , and so no low-level interaction between the process and the test is possible; the success state will not be reached.
Two processes will be must p testing equivalent if they must pass exactly the same tests:
Definition 3.12 P mustp Q if and only if 8T : TEST LNp (P must p T , Q must p T) 2 Example 3.13 If P 2 = h r2 ! h n2 ! l r ! l n ! P 2 2 l r ! l n ! P 2 and P 3 = h r2 ! h n2 ! l r ! l n ! P 3 u h n ! l r ! l n ! P 3 2 l r ! l n ! P 3 then P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 are all must p equivalent. A process which interacts with them only on l r and l n will be unable to distinguish between them.
This means that two processes P and Q should be considered equivalent (from the point of view of the interface information S) if any test which has access only to the events in L (a particular view of the process), and does not block the events in LN p , cannot tell the di erence between P and Q.
If p 0 is such that LR p0 = , and H p0 and LN p0 are all ?, then must p0 testing is equivalent to the standard notion of must testing. In this case, the testing process has access to all the events that the processes under test can perform; and is able to block any of them. This is the most powerful kind of test within this framework: it allows the most distinctions to be made.
In other words, must testing is equivalent to must p0 testing. From the point of view of must testing, it makes a di erence whether the high-level events are refusable or not, since we are concerned with liveness and progress. For example, h ! l ! STOP is must p equivalent to l ! STOP if h is not refusable, but the two processes are distinguishable if h is refusable. In that case the rst process might be blocked from performing the event h, and never reach the stage where it o ers the event l. This cannot happen for the second process. One test which distinguishes these two processes is 
Changing views
The notion of abstraction is bound up in the available views of a process as given by the sets L and H , and also by the distinction between refusable and non-refusable events within those sets. Varying the views on processes gives di erent degrees of abstraction and varies the capability of an observer to tell processes apart.
Views on a process might be varied by shifting the boundary between refusable and non-refusable events, at high and low-levels; and by shifting the boundary between levels for refusable and for non-refusable events.
As the boundaries are shifted and the partition function p changes, the equivalence relation mustp changes accordingly. The four possible locations of an event of P's interface may be ordered as in Figure 4 , where higher positions for events result in weaker equivalence relations: those more abstract relations which identify more processes. Thus as previously observed, if all events are in LR p then the equivalence is strongest, and in fact is equivalent to standard must testing; and if all events are in HN p (or in fact a combination of HN p and HR p ) then the equivalence is weakest, able only to identify the possibility of divergence in a process.
Each order relation in Figure 4 is associated with a lemma which supports the claim that transferring events from the lower to the higher set preserves mustp However, if HR HN = , then no new equivalences are introduced, since mustp will be the weakest it can be, only able to distinguish non-divergent processes from possibly-divergent ones.
The next lemma states that increasing LN at the expense of LR preserves must testing equivalence. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 5 . 
2
Proof Any test T which distinguishes P from Q in the context of p 0 will also serve as a test to distinguish P from Q in the context of p. Thus if P mustp Q then P must p 0 Q.
Increasing LN introduces new equivalences in general. For example, if l 1 and l 2 are in LR, then the processes
However, if l 1 and l 2 are contained in LN , then there is no test that can distinguish P 1 from P 2 , and they are therefore must equivalent 3 . He The next lemma states that increasing HR at the expense of LR preserves must testing equivalence. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 6 . high-level non-refusable events are hidden from any interacting process, and they are urgent, so they behave as hidden events. This is made explicit in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.19 For any process P, P mustp (P n HN p ) 2
Proof Suppose there is an unsuccessful complete execution of P in parallel with some test. Then P n HN p can engage in the same execution, interacting on the same low-level events and performing the same high-level events (though they are now labelled with actions). This execution will also be complete for P n HN p . Conversely, suppose there is an unsuccessful complete execution of P n HN p in parallel with a test T. Then P can step through the same execution, and it will be complete for P as well. Hence P and P n HN p may fail exactly the same tests, so they must pass exactly the same tests. The non-refusability of the high-level event means that at the low level the l n event is guaranteed to be o ered. In contrast, a refusable high-level event yields the following:
At the low level, the event l r might never be o ered, since the high-level event could be refused in a complete execution. In this case, the low-level behaviour is described by STOP. However, the high-level event could also be performed, and so the possibility of the low-level event is also present. In this example, the high-level events are non-refusable, and so one of them is guaranteed to occur in a complete execution. However, the testing process has no control over which will occur, and so the process is equivalent to one which o ers a nondeterministic choice between the two low-level events. An observer who can engage only in low-level events cannot distinguish these three processes.
Observe that there is information ow from high to low in the two processes that have high-level events: the identity of the low-level event that occurs allows the identity of the preceding high-level event to be deduced.
Example 3.22 The`refusal' of a low-level non-refusable event can still be detected by some tests, even if the traces are exactly the same. For example, l n ! STOP 6 must STOP u l n ! STOP since the test T = l n ! ! ! RUN ln is guaranteed to succeed on the left-hand process, but not on the right-hand one.
However, if some other non-refusable event is possible, then it masks the distinction:
There is no LN -test that can distinguish these two processes, as any such test must initially o er l n2 alongside l n , and so every complete execution must contain some low-level event.
On the other hand, if only refusable event are possible alongside l n , then the distinction can still be made:
The same test T as above will distinguish these processes. If p 1 (a) = lr; p 1 (b) = hr and p 2 (a) = hr; p 2 (b) = lr, then P 1 must p1 P 2 P 1 must p2 P 2 The two processes are indistinguishable when only a, or only b, is available to be tested.
However, if both a and b are low-level events, then there is a test that distinguishes P 1 from P 2 :
It is possible for P 1 to fail this test, by performing a but then failing to engage in b; whereas P 2 cannot do this, since if it can perform a then it can also perform b.
In this example, the occurrences of a and b in P 1 are completely independent of each other, and the performance of one provides no information about the performance of the other. On the other hand, in P 2 the a and the b are either both available or both unavailable, and so the occurrence of one does provide information about the availability of the other. 
A note on refusal testing
If the tests had the ability to carry out refusal testing (which a timed framework, for example, would give them) then the distinction between LN p and LR p is again signi cant. Refusal testing would be possible only on those events in LR p , and so moving them to LN p would lose some distinctions that could be made and introduce some new equivalences.
The traditional refusal testing example illustrates the point:
Two vending machines can either return a coin, or else provide tea or co ee. These are indistinguishable under must testing. However, V 2 can refuse tea and then provide co ee, a behaviour that is not possible for V 1. In our framework there is no test that can make this distinction. If tea and co ee are in LN p , then these will be considered equivalent in a refusal testing framework because the tests will be required to be available on both of these events and so unable to test them for refusal. However, if either of these events is in LR p then it could be tested for refusal, and thus distinguish the processes. For example, if tea is in LR p then the test that fails if tea is refused and co ee subsequently performed, but succeeds otherwise, will distinguish the two processes.
Re nement
The operational characterisation of must testing equivalence also generalises in the usual way to must p testing re nement. Essentially, Q will be a re nement of P if any test T that P must succeed must also allow Q to succeed: Definition 3.24 P v mustp Q , 8T : TEST LNp P must p T ) Q must p T 2
In this case, if there is any context in which P is guaranteed to behave appropriately, then Q must also be guaranteed to behave appropriately. In the case of must testing, the process description P encapsulates the behaviour that should be guaranteed, in contrast to the world of may testing where P simply describes what is permitted.
Denotational characterisations
It is useful to have a characterisation in terms of the denotational semantics for when two processes are must p equivalent, and when they are may p equivalent. This allows model-checkers such as FDR to be deployed in analysing processes for such equivalences.
May equivalence
With regard to may testing, two processes will be considered equivalent with regard to a particular low-level view if their trace sets are identical when projected onto that view. 
Must equivalence
Encapsulating must testing equivalence in the most general case is not straightforward. There are two independent issues to be resolved: one concerning the appropriate way to handle the high-level events; and the other concerning how best to treat the low-level non-refusable events. Lemma 3.19 indicates that non-refusable high-level events can simply be hidden. high-level refusable events should also be removed from view, but in a way which does not make them urgent (since they are not required to occur). This can be achieved by running the process in parallel with a process which might block such high-level events at any stage; and then hiding all the highlevel events. This is the approach taken in GH97], by means of a`regulator' process.
Case 1: LN = ?
We will begin by considering the set of low-level non-refusable events to be empty. As before, high-level urgent events can simply be hidden Proof If P 6 mustp Q then there is some test T which distinguishes P from Q. In this case, there is (without loss of generality) an unsuccessful complete execution e of P in parallel with T, whereas all complete executions of Q in parallel with T are successful. The execution e consists of a sequence of high and low-level transition steps, where the low-level transitions are in synchronisation with T and the high-level steps are independent. If the execution contains an in nite number of low-level events, then Q cannot not exhibit the same sequence of low-level events or else Q could take T through the same sequence of unsuccessful states. Hence there is an in nite trace of P that is not an in nite trace of Q, so their FDI semantics are di erent. Otherwise, the execution contains a nite number of low-level events. If it contains an in nite number of highlevel events, then it will correspond to a divergence of abs p (P). If abs p (Q) has the same divergence, then it can also take T through an unsuccessful complete execution (the same one or one which diverges earlier), which contradicts the assumption that Q must p T. Hence abs p (Q) has a di erent FDI semantics.
Finally, if the complete unsuccessful execution has a nite number of both high-level and low-level events, then it must end in a state where no internal events of events from HR are possible. This corresponds to an execution of P j HR ]j CHAOS HR which ends in a state where no internal events, or internal events from HR or HN are possible, which in turn corresponds to a failure of abs p (P) (since the nal state is stable). If abs p (Q) exhibits the same failure, then it can engage in a similar complete execution which takes T through the same states, and hence is also unsuccessful. But this contradicts the assumption that Q must p T. Hence there is a failure which distinguishes abs p (P) from abs p (Q).
Hence in all cases, if P 6 mustp Q then FDI (abs p (P)) 6 = FDI (abs p (Q)). Conversely, suppose that FDI (abs p (P)) 6 = FDI (abs p (Q)). Then there is some behaviour that distinguishes them. In this case, a test can be constructed which distinguishes P from Q.
If abs p (P) and abs p (Q) di er on a divergence tr = hl 1 : : : l n i (assume without loss of generality that tr 2 divergences(P) n divergences(Q)) then the test T = T 1 will make the distinction, where
An execution of a process P in parallel with this test can fail only if there is an execution of P whose projection onto L is tr, and which is either divergent itself or else able to perform in nitely many events from HN |precisely the conditions for tr to be a divergence of abs p (P). Thus Q must p T but :(P must p T).
If abs p (P) and abs p (Q) have identical divergences, but di er on an in nite trace u = hl 1 ; l 2 ; : : :i (assume without loss of generality that u 2 in nites(abs p (P)) n in nites(abs p (Q)), then the test T = T 1 using the de nition above (with n = 1) will make the distinction.
Finally abs p (P) and abs p (Q) agree on their divergences and in nite traces, but di er on some failure (tr; X ) where tr = hl 1 ; : : : ; l n i (assume without loss of generality that (tr; X ) 2 failures(abs p (P)) n failures(abs p (Q)), then the test T = T 1 as de ned below will make the distinction. Hence this test distinguishes P from Q.
2
This gives us a low-level view of a process: the low-level view of P is simply (abs p (P)). This only has low-level events. Any two processes which exhibit this low-level behaviour are indistinguishable through that view of the process.
Case 2: LN 6 = ?
If the set of low-level non-refusable events is not empty, then there are some constraints on the low-level behaviour of the tests.
Subcase 1: H = ?
To begin with, we will consider the situation where there are no high-level events at all: every event is low-level, some are refusable and some are not.
Any nite complete execution must end up in a state in which all LN events are impossible for the process. This must correspond to a failure (tr; X ) of the process for which LN X . The events in LN which were performed should appear in the trace, since they were accessible to the tests. This corresponds to treating the events as urgent but visible, which is not as aspect of standard CSP, but which has been analysed in the context of timed CSP DJS92]. The failures of such a process will be given as the urgent failures (with respect to LN ), de ned as ufailures LN (P) = f(tr; X ) 2 failures(P) j LN X g Such a set does not meet the standard axioms for CSP, as Example 4.3 illustrates. In fact, it turns out that it need not meet any of the axioms pertaining to failures: it is not necessarily pre x-closed on traces, subset closed on refusals, or even non-empty, and events need not extend either a trace or a refusal set. This set is neither pre x-closed on traces, subset closed on refusals, and on the behaviour with the empty trace the event nr can extend neither the trace (by itself) or the refusal. A recursive process that is always willing to perform events from LN , such as P = ln ! P, has an empty urgent failure set. However, it is guaranteed to have in nite traces corresponding to the sequences of events from LN that it must be able to perform.
2
Along with the divergences and in nite traces, the urgent failures set does characterise must testing equivalence with regard to non-refusable low-level events: We will refer to this triple of semantic sets of P (with respect to the partition p) as UDI p (P).
Proof If P and Q are di erent under testing, then the test that distinguishes them must expose some di erence in one of these sets. An in nite complete execution exposes a di erence in the divergences or the failures, as in the proof of Theorem 4.2. A nite complete execution exposes a di erence in the failures, but a failure in which LN is refused; so the ufailures provide su cient information. If P and Q are di erent on one of these sets, then there is some test that can be constructed which distinguishes them by failing only on that particular behaviour. If they di er on divergences or in nite traces, then a test can be constructed as in the proof of Theorem 4.2. If they di er on ufailures then a test can also be constructed as before, introducing at every state an extra choice, of every event in LN to the success state.
A new CSP operator sticky LN (P) can be de ned which provides a context for characterising urgent failures: FDI ( sticky ( P)) = FDI ( sticky ( Q)) if and only P and Q have the same urgent failures, divergences, and traces. As we shall see, this can be de ned in terms of standard operators, enabling model-checking within FDR.
The sticky operator masks non-urgent failures on a set LN by introducing as many refusals as possible whenever an event from LN is possible. In particular, whenever an event l from LN is possible, then it introduces the possibility that all other events should be refused, and that l is the only possible event. This has a similar e ect to making the events in LN urgent, since it is the process P itself (and not its environment) that chooses the event to be performed. In order to be consistent with the axioms of the FDI model, such events cannot be forced to occur (since the process might be in an uncooperative environment), but once P has selected an event, it will then refuse all other events.
It is de ned denotationally as follows:
divergences( sticky LN (P)) = divergences(P) in nites( sticky LN (P)) = in nites(P) failures( sticky LN (P)) = failures(P) f(tr; X ) j (tr a l; ?) 2 failures(P) l 2 LN^l 6 2 X g
Observe that sticky LN (P) has the same traces as P. It is only additional refusals that are introduced into the failure set. Theorem 4.4 given above can be characterised in this form: This new operator can also be given an operational semantics, which may provide an alternative understanding of its behaviour. The process sticky LN (P) will have all the transitions that P has together with a few extra ones introduced to allow events from LN to be`selected'. Two rules de ne its operational semantics: If the events in LN are hidden, it makes no di erence whether they are abstracted by means of the sticky operator rst: P n LN = ( sticky LN (P)) n LN Example 4.6 Let LN = fl1; l2g. The operator sticky LN (P) has the e ect of allowing the process to choose to perform events in LN , or at least to block further progress until the chosen event is performed. Thus an external choice becomes internal: This process allows all events of the form (old; a), but whenever the event a is in LN , then it must perform the event (new; a) before any further events. sticky can then be de ned as follows:
sticky LN (P) = g((f (P) j f ( ) ]j R) n f (LN )) Any sticky event a 2 LN of P is performed internally in this process (as (old; a)), but P is prevented from any further progress by R until (new; a) occurs (which appears in the overall process as the original sticky event a because of the renaming g). Non-sticky events are performed as expected.
Subcase 2 : H 6 = ?
Finally, in the most general case, we arrive at the following theorem:
Theorem 4.7 P mustp Q , sticky LN (abs p (P)) = sticky LN (abs p (Q)) 2
Observe that sticky LN (abs p (P)) = abs p ( sticky LN (P)). The order in which the abstractions are performed is irrelevant.
Congruence
The equivalences considered in this paper are not congruences in general, which is perhaps why they are not generally considered in the literature on testing. This fact is unsurprising, since operators can in uence the behaviour of a process through its abstracted interface, and if processes di er there then they may be a ected di erently. since the processes behave di erently on the abstracted event hr 1 , they can behave di erently when placed in parallel with a process that interacts with them on that event.
Another example concerns the event renaming where f (h r1 ) = l 1 , f (h r2 ) = h r2 , and f (l) = l. In this case f (h r1 ! l ! STOP) 6 mustp f (h r2 ! l ! STOP)
Finally, an event renaming that renames a high-level refusable event to a high-level non-refusable event, but does not map high to low or low to high: f (h r1 ) = h n1 , f (h r2 ) = h r2 , and f (l) = l. In this case
The left hand process cannot refuse l at the low level, whereas the right hand process can.
The rst two examples also illustrate may equivalences that are not preserved; the last example does preserve may equivalence.
2
However, many of the operators do preserve both equivalences. Pre xing, sequential composition (provided X is low-level), all forms of choice, and hiding certainly do so. Parallel composition does so, provided all synchronisations are at the low level: thus interleaving preserves equivalence, as does the operator j A ]j provided A L. Event renaming f (P) preserves mustp provided the partitions are respected: so p(f (a)) = p(a) for all events a is required for mustp . With mayp , we require simply that high-level events do not become low-level, so a 2 H ) f (a) 2 H is su cient to guarantee preservation of equality.
Re nement
Both may and must re nement are characterised in the denotational framework in the expected way: P v may p Q , traces(Q n H p ) traces(P n H p ) P v mustp Q , FDI ( sticky LN (abs p (Q))) FDI ( sticky LN (abs p (P)))
where on FDI semantics is de ned pointwise on each of the three components: failures, divergences, and in nite traces. The operational characterisation of re nement is thus equivalent to the denotational characterisations.
5 Non-interference Non-interference properties are generally considered in the context of a given system. The requirement is that even if an agent knows exactly how the system works, there is no information ow across particular boundaries concerned with particular activity on that system. In other words, the options available to the low-level user should not divulge any information about the high-level users' activity. High-level users' activity is concerned with events in HR; the set HN consists of those high-level events entirely within the control of the system. Knowing that the system will perform an event of HN does not leak information about high-level activity, since the high-level user is unable to prevent it.
Information ow from high to low will be prevented if P's low-level possibilities at any stage are dependent entirely on P's previous low-level behaviour, and not in terms of any high-level behaviour. This would seem to indicate that if two sequences of events have been performed, which appear the same on the low level, then the resulting processes should be equivalent.
This characterisation can be made in various ways. It has traditionally been made denotationally, and this has led to some di culties to its relationship with re nement. If e is an execution of a process P, then Ltrace p (e) is the sequence of low-level (in the sense of the partition p) events in e.
Operationally, lack of information ow in P from high to low level might be characterised as follows: Definition 5.1 A process P is interference-free with respect to p if In this case, we can say that P is interference-free on p. This is a very strong de nition: it excludes nondeterministic processes, even those that can perform no high-level events, such as P = l r1 ! STOP u l r2 ! STOP: the distinguishable processes l r1 ! STOP and l r2 ! STOP are both reachable via the empty trace. In fact in such cases, a re nement of this system (with respect to the low-level view) might introduce high-level events and lose interferencefreedom as a result. For example, the process Q = h r1 ! l r1 ! STOP 2 l r2 ! STOP is actually equivalent to P described above, with respect to the low-level interface, and yet Q leaks information from high to low.
This operational de nition is attractive in one sense, since it considers individually all possible processes resulting from the execution, rather than considering them all together (where the acceptable behaviour of some can mask the unacceptable behaviour of others), as is the case with the denotational`after' operator.
This de nition has the di culty that it is dependent on the precise nature of the operational semantics for a process, and two processes that are equivalent (under must testing for example) might be treated di erently by the de nition. This means that it cannot be characterised denotationally, and that in general its truth or falsity is not determined from the denotational semantics.
Divergence
To take an extreme example, the process which has one state and is only able to perform internal actions to that one state may be de ned recursively as follows: ? = ?. It is must equivalent to ? u LEAK , where LEAK is a process which takes in messages on a high-level channel, and immediately communicates them on a low-level channel: LEAK = in H ?x ! out L !x ! LEAK . Yet ? meets the de nition, whereas ? u LEAK does not.
The desire to have no information ow preserved by re nement has led to some di culties with regard to this example. If ? is seen as a process which does not provide information ow, but it can be re ned by LEAK , then it is patently clear that any de nition of security with respect to information ow is either going to fail on ? or else will not be preserved by re nement.
Divergence-free processes
If the process is divergence-free, then the situation is rather better. In this case, the de nition will hold of precisely those processes whose low-level behaviour is deterministic: that is, those processes P for which abs p (P) is deterministic. This coincides with Roscoe's characterisation of non-interference.
Theorem 5.2 If P is divergence-free, then P is interference-free on p if and only if abs p (P) is deterministic.
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Proof (sketch) If abs p (P) is deterministic, then given any execution P e =) P 0 , then the process P 0 reached after the execution must be a re nement (in the denotational sense) of the process P = trace(e). This means that abs p (P 0 ) is a renement of abs p (P = trace(e)), which in turn is a re nement of abs p (P) = Ltrace p (e). But this process is deterministic, since abs p (P) is, and so abs p (P 0 ) must be denotationally equivalent to abs p (P = tr) (since they are both re nements of the same deterministic process, and hence equivalent to it and thus to each other). This must be the case for any process P 0 reached after any execution corresponding on the low level to tr, and so all such processes are denotationally equivalent, and thus mustp equivalent. Hence the de nition will always apply to processes whose low level views are deterministic.
Conversely, if abs p (P) is not deterministic, then there is some low-level trace tr such that tr a hli is a possible low-level trace, and (tr; flg) is a possible low-level refusal set. Since P is not divergent, these behaviours correspond to particular executions of P. This means that there are executions e 1 and e 2 corresponding to tr such that P e1 =) P 1 l ?! and P e2 =) P 2 such that P 2 6 ?! and P 2 6 l ?! . In other words, P can reach a state P 1 from which l is possible, and can also reach a stable state P 2 from which l is not possible. Then the test T = (x : LN ! ! ! STOP 2 l ! RUN LN ) 2 (a ! ! ! STOP) n a can fail only if l is initially possible. Thus P 2 must p T but :(P 1 must p T). Hence P can reach two states that are distinguishable by some low-level test.
Observe that this theorem holds even if LN 6 = ?, despite the fact that tests cannot directly detect refusals of events in LN . This means that two processes might be indistinguishable under testing, yet the de nition of non-interference applies di erently to them. For example, consider the two processes: P 1 = h 1 ! l n1 ! P 1 2 h 2 ! l n2 ! P 1 P 2 = h : fh 1 ; h 2 g ! l : fl n1 ; l n2 g ! P 2 If LN = fl n1 ; l n2 g, then these two processes are indistinguishable at the low level. Any low-level test must always be ready to accept all events in LN , and so is able to make distinctions only on the basis of traces|and P 1 and P 2 have the same low-level traces.
On the other hand, it is clear that P 1 allows interference whereas P 2 does not, and in fact P 1 fails the de nition given above whereas P 2 meets it: abs p (P 1 ) is non-deterministic whereas abs p (P 2 ) is deterministic.
This example also illustrates the point that interference-freedom is concerned with particular processes that are given. The aim in interference-freedom is not to distinguish P 1 from P 2 , but rather to make deductions about high-level activity from the visible low-level activity in a given process.
Atomicity and fault-tolerance
Atomicity is a feature of particular kinds of speci cation, where the desired behaviour is characterised in terms of the occurrence or availability of a single event.
Typically in analysing fault tolerance, faults are modelled by the occurrence of special fault events. These might appear at certain points of a process' description, indicating that the fault can occur at that stage during the process' execution. They will then be modelled as refusable events|the environment might perform them when the process makes them`available', but is not obliged to do so.
The low-level activity need not be deterministic, so this is di erent from consideration of information ow properties.
For example, a one-place bu er that can lose its contents on the occurrence of a particular fault might be described as follows: FBUFF = in?x ! out!x ! FBUFF 2 power blip ! FBUFF 2 power blip ! FBUFF On the other hand, fault recovery will generally be modelled as non-refusable events: the fault recovery mechanism is under the control of the process itself, and should not be blocked by the environment.
As a crude example, a system might undergo a fault between input and output, from which it must recover before performing output. This could be modelled, extremely crudely, as FT = in?x ! out!x ! STOP 2 fault ! recover ! out!x ! STOP
The requirement on the system might be that, when the fault recovery mechanisms are out of the view of the user, then this system, should look like a simple bu er taking an input to an output. In other words, the requirement on the system is that it is a re nement under must p testing to SPEC = in?x ! out!x ! STOP Here we have p(fault) = hr and p(recover) = hn.
Then SPEC v must p FT.
If p(fault) = hn, then any complete execution would not be able to nish if a fault was possible|this is tantamount to relying on the fault to occur. In this case, SPEC must FT again holds, but so too does the equivalence in?x ! fault ! recover ! out!x ! STOP mustp FT which relies on fault to occur in order to guarantee output.
Conversely, if p(recover) = hr then recovery can be blocked. In this case correct behaviour cannot be guaranteed, and in fact The approach to fault-tolerant modelling suggested by this example is to treat fault events as high-level refusable events HR, to treat system recovery mechanisms as high-level non-refusable events HN , and to treat the normal part of the system, which the user interacts with, in terms of low-level events (either refusable or non-refusable as appropriate).
Bullet-proof write
For example, a memory cell may be speci ed by the following process description:
Any user of this cell may either write a fresh value w to it, or else read its current contents v. A protocol which ensures that a write is successful by means of a sequence of internal events would be required to exhibit the same behaviour as this speci cation. The speci cation is concerned with atomicity in the sense that the internal behaviour should implement a single write event.
An implementation MEMIMP(v) would be required to re ne MEM (v) when observed through the interface fwrite; readg:
In this case, all the`high'-level events would be internal system events and would therefore be urgent. The low-level events on read and write are under the control of the environment and are therefore in LR|the environment can refuse them. The sets LN and HR are empty. Since MEM (v) is deterministic, any implementation must actually be equivalent to it. In fault-tolerant systems, the nature and impact of the faults to be tolerated can have an e ect on the speci cation. For example, an implementation may be required to cope with the possibility of power failures on volatile memory. Such a fault-tolerant design cannot hope to guarantee success in a write operation, since an update might become lost at the moment it is provided. In this case, the requirement will be that the memory cell itself should not be corrupted, and should remain with its previous value.
This weaker speci cation of a fault-tolerant memory cell FTMEM is expressed as follows: Much of the fault-tolerance will not be expressed directly as a CSP speci cation, but will rather be contained within the modelling of the system components which comprise the system BPW . The faults that are possible will be modelled explicitly as events which are possible for their components, and their impact will also be contained within the component description. The set of all fault events can be given as the set FAULTS. All such fault events will be considered as high-level refusable events, and so FAULTS HR. A memory cell implementation will be fault-tolerant in a particular sense if it can always recover from corruption in the presence of fault events which can cause corruption. On the other hand, it will not be fault-tolerant to the extent that it will sometimes fail to do the update. Fault-tolerance is generally with respect to particular faults, and coping with the most serious faults might result in a degraded service.
A liveness or correctness expectation would be that the memory should be updated when no fault events occur:
MEM (v) v mustp STOP j FAULTS ]j BPW (v)
This will prevent a trivial implementation whereby no update is ever carried out.
Database transaction
We may wish to think of obtaining an answer from a database as an atomic transaction. But if we put in a request for an answer, and the database has to do some recovery rst (e.g. if it becomes clear that there is some corruption of data) then this should be invisible to the user, and contained as part of thè atomic' transaction of receiving an answer.
Here the speci cation would be SPEC = query?x ! answer!f (x) ! SPEC , and the requirement on any implementation IMP is that SPEC v mustp IMP.
In order to make this speci cation precise, it must be decided where each event appears in the interface. In this case, the query is under the control of the environment and hence will appear in LR, the answer can be under the control of the system and hence appear in LN , and all other events appear in H , with the fault events appearing in HR.
The user does not want or need to see all the internal activity, so from his point of view the system does behave in an atomic way. From the point of view of the`tests' that the user can attempt, the operation answer is atomic.
Summary
This paper has been concerned with providing a more explicit approach to the kind of abstraction that is achieved when processes are viewed through particular interfaces, and where their events can be considered as refusable or not refusable by the environment of the process. The results have reinforced the denotational approach, provided a more explicit explanation and justi cation, and indeed have extended that approach by considering a more general categorisation of events.
This form of abstraction has been analysed for both may and must testing with respect to a partition p of the interface of the process, and the variation in the relations as the partition p varies has also been analysed: as less control over events is provided to the testing environment (either through removal from the interface, or through non-refusability), the equivalence relations become weaker.
The may testing equivalence and re nement relations turn out to be relatively straightforward to characterise in denotational terms, and are indeed equivalent to the denotational approaches which have been traditionally taken.
Must testing equivalence and re nement have also resulted in the expected equivalences as far as high-level, and refusable low-level events are concerned; but the relations when low-level non-refusable events are permitted have not been previously considered, and were tricky to characterise. At present it is still an open question whether the equivalence relation in this case can be characterised using the existing CSP language, or whether an extension would be required.
This approach to abstraction has been used in what appears to be an extremely strong operational characterisation of non-interference (or interferencefreedom) which turns out to be equivalent to Roscoe's RWW94] characterisation on non-divergent processes. We have also considered its place in the speci cation of fault-tolerant systems, and in the characterisation of speci cations that make use of atomicity.
